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The objective of this paper is to test the hypothesis that in particular financially constrained 
firms lease a higher share of their assets to mitigate problems of asymmetric information. The 
assumptions are tested under a GMM framework which simultaneously controls for 
endogeneity problems and firms’ fixed effects. We find that the share of total annual lease 
expenses attributable to either finance or operating leases is considerably higher for 
financially strained as well as for small and fast-growing firms – those likely to face higher 
agency-cost premiums on marginal financing. Furthermore, our results confirm the 
substitution of leasing and debt financing for lessee firms. However, we find no evidence that 
firms use leasing as an instrument to reduce their tax burdens. 
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The determinants which drive ﬁrms’ capital structure decisions have been at the heart of cor-
porate ﬁnance research. Almost 20 years ago Harris and Raviv (1991) concluded that research
on theoretical models explaining capital structure decisions under asymmetric information has
reached a point of diminishing returns. However, up to date there has been a wide gap between
empirical evidence on this topic and its theoretical counterpart (Hackethal and Schmidt 2004).
Bharath et al. (2006) ﬁnd for a sample of U.S. ﬁrms that information asymmetry does affect
capital structure decisions but do not consider lease ﬁnancing. We aim to ﬁll this void by inves-
tigating whether ﬁrms for which information asymmetries are more severe lease a greater share
of their assets by considering a group of ﬁrms that is particularly affected: Small and medium
sized enterprises (SME).
The ﬁnancial intermediation literature offers several hypotheses about which intermediaries
have vantages in providing ﬁnancing to small and informationally opaque ﬁrms. An often
suggested remedy to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information which can cause credit
rationing is relationship lending where banks not only seize quantitative but also qualitative
(so-called soft-) information about their clients (e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1994)). However,
the introduction of the Basel II accord and the associated risk-adjusted pricing of loans has set
limits to this form of ﬁnancing and made credit for companies with poor ratings more expensive
or in other cases led to rationing (KfW 2008). To this end, leasing can represent a valuable
alternative.
So far, academic research on leasing mainly focused on tax-arbitrage and the question
whether leases and debt serve as substitutes or complements. Contrary to economic theory
Ang and Peterson (1984) found a complementing relation between debt and leases. This ﬁnd-
ing was later re-examined by Adedeji and Stapleton (1996) who found evidence in favor of the
substitution theory and suggested that the positive relationship reported by Ang and Peterson
was induced by the inclusion of a large number of non-leasing companies as well as a lack of
controlling for taxable capacity. In the same vein, Yan (2006) and Deloof et al.’s (2007) results
yielded evidence that leases and debt substitute each other empirically rather than acting as
complements.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on leasing by shifting the debate to the ques-
tion under what conditions leasing can serve as an alternative form of ﬁnance when ﬁrms are ﬁ-
nancially constrained. Theory suggests that the lessors ability to repossess the asset enables him
2to grant more credit than a lender who takes a security interest in an asset – a feature which be-
comes particularly relevant in the presence of ﬁnancing constraints. Eisfeld and Rampini (2009)
point out that this property has implications on several key aspects of corporate ﬁnance and sug-
gest that the amount of operating leases may be used as a revealed preference indicator of the
extent to which a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained. If that hypothesis were correct we should
expect to see ﬁrms which are more likely to be ﬁnancially constraint – due to asymmetric in-
formation or higher risk – to employ more lease ﬁnancing. However, a well-known problem
among empiricists in this ﬁeld is to actually ﬁnd a good proxy for the degree of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial
constraint. We attempt to tackle this problem by considering a range of indicators associated
with ﬁnancing constraints and argue that a signiﬁcance of several of these factors would yield
strong circumstantial evidence to support this hypothesis. Thus we look in particular at small,
fast-growing, liquidity strained companies as well as ﬁrms with lower sales margins to assess
whether such ﬁrms have a greater propensity to lease.
This paper employs a unique panel data set with detailed ﬁnancial information on 20,442
small and private German ﬁrms over the period 2002 – 2006 which has been provided by the
German Savings Banks Association (DSGV). To test our hypotheses we apply a generalized
method of moments (GMM) framework which simultaneously controls for endogeneity prob-
lems and ﬁrms’ ﬁxed effects. To account for differences in the reporting requirements for leases
in Germany in comparison to US Financial Accounting Standards (FAS 13) we follow Beattie et
al. (2000) and consider a comprehensive measure of leasing which includes total lease expenses
(i.e. operating and ﬁnance) from the proﬁt and loss statements instead of capitalized leases from
balance sheet data.1
By way of preview, our most important ﬁndings are as follows: (i) SME which lease a
larger fraction of their assets are characterized by smaller size, fast-growth, higher interest rates,
strained liquidity and lower sales margins; (ii) around half of the ﬁrms in our sample make use
of leasing of which 90% prefer non-capitalized leases; (iii) the use of leasing as ﬁnancing
instrument has increased by 16% (in relative terms) over the observation period. However, it
seems to be much more important for smaller ﬁrms for which leases represent the major part
(52%) of their external ﬁnancing costs; (iv) leases and debt are found to be used as substitutes.
This is implied by the negative sign of the coefﬁcient for debt and the positive sign of the interest
1The reporting requirements for leases in Germany differ from requirements in the US. Contrary to FAS 13 there
are capitalized and non-capitalized ﬁnance leases depending on the speciﬁc nature of the contract. Thus a ﬁnance
lease is not distinguishable from an operating lease if it is not capitalized on the lessee’s balance sheet.
3rate coefﬁcient (both signiﬁcant); (v) we ﬁnd no evidence that ﬁrms use leases to reduce their
tax burden. In fact, our analysis shows that ﬁrms with lower tax expenses (before ﬁnancing
costs) have a greater tendency to lease. As a ﬁnal contribution, this paper shows that estimation
results are biased if problems of endogeneity and heteroskedasticity are not accounted for.
An overview over the importance of leasing in Germany and the regulatory framework is
given in section 2. In section 3, a brief outline of the theoretical notion of rationales for ﬁrms
to lease is provided and the hypotheses for the instated variables are discussed. Section 4
describes the data characteristics and presents several descriptive statistics. Section 5 provides
the methodology. The results of the econometric models are presented in section 6 and section
7 summarizes and concludes.
2 Leasing in Germany
Leasing history in Germany began in 1962 with the foundation of the ﬁrst leasing company, ten
years after the origination of its ﬁrst counterpart in the United States. Since then, leasing has
encountered a steadily increasing importance as an investment alternative. According to the As-
sociation of German Leasing Companies (Bundesverband Deutscher Leasing-Unternehmen), in
2007 leasing companies ﬁnanced investments of e 57.4 billion of which 88% was accountable
to movable investment goods. This was close to 10% more than in 2006 and set a new record.
By the end of 2007, leasing accounted for 18% of all investments made in Germany.
A recent study for the German leasing market which interviewed 706 lessee ﬁrms (TNS In-
fratest 2007) reported that the top two reasons for ﬁrms to lease are the predictability and trans-
parency of costs (59% of the participants) and a preference for machinery and equipment that is
always up-to-date (52%). The argument that leasing preserves capital was conﬁrmed by 46% of
the participants whereas 42% stated the tax argument as an important factor to lease. Interest-
ingly, the argument that leasing preserves capital was given as ﬁrst reason in the corresponding
surveys made in 1994 and 2002. A possible explanation for this change in priorities could pro-
vide the leap of the economy in the preceding year to the study. This boom was in particular
fuelled by strong domestic demand (KfW 2007) which led to a larger ﬁnancial cushion for Ger-
man SME and a possible decreased preference (in relation to the other factors stated) for the
preservation of capital.
4Accounting and tax requirements for leases According to FAS requirements a ﬁnance (cap-
ital) lease is capitalized by the lessee and reported as corresponding debt obligation on the
balance sheet. Consequently, the lessee depreciates the leased asset and amortizes the debt li-
ability. A ﬁnance lease is thus akin to a debt obligation and requires similar disclosures as an
asset purchase. An operating lease, on the other hand, represents off-balance-sheet ﬁnancing for
the lessee, and is reported on the proﬁt and loss statements as a lease expense. Under German
accounting rules (HGB), however, a ﬁnance lease is not automatically capitalized by the lessee
but deﬁned by the following procedure: First, a ﬁnance lease is constituted if (i) the leasing
contract cannot be canceled during its duration and (ii) if the cumulative leasing rates cover at
least the purchase and ﬁnance cost of the lessor (full-pay-out-lease).2 Second, the requirements
for the lessee to report the ﬁnance lease on the balance sheet are determined by four conditions
stated in table 1.3
[Insert table 1 around here]
In summary, operating leases are not reported on the balance sheet whereas ﬁnance leases
are only capitalized by the lessee if the above stated requirements hold. However, practitioners
conveyed to us in discussions that in practice ﬁnance lease contracts predominate and are com-
monly designed for the lessor to depreciate the asset. Thus, by assessing the amount of ﬁnance
leases by capitalized lease obligations on the balance sheet one must be aware that this number
may be understated. Since we can not distinguish an operating lease from a non-capitalized
ﬁnance lease we refer henceforth to the terms capitalized and non-capitalized lease.4
3 Theoretical framework
The basic economic rule to buy or lease is rather straightforward: Buy if the equivalent annual
cost of ownership and operation is less than the best lease rate offered by a lessor. However, one
2There is no deﬁnition for an operating lease under German law; an operating lease is simply equated with a
non-ﬁnance lease.
3For the corresponding German rulings see "Bundessteuerblatt (1971), page 264, paragraph II".
4For tax requirements, the main difference in the two types of leases is that operating leases, unlike ﬁnance
leases, also provide trade tax advantages (until 2008) because interest payments included in the lease expenses
do not affect the taxable base as for instance interest payments on liabilities do. The basis for taxation of leases
in Germany is in § 39 General Tax Code as interpreted by the Federal Tax Court (1970). Based on this law the
Ministry of Finance decreed four general letter rulings issued in 1971 and 1972 (full-pay-out-leases) and 1975 and
1991 (non-full-pay-out-leases).
5of the most prominent features of leasing contracts is their ﬂexibility toward customers needs
and thus there is also a non-monetary utility associated with lease ﬁnancing.
First, cash-ﬂows originating from the asset and pay back rates may be aligned in order re-
tain liquidity. Likewise, many leasing contracts incorporate full maintenance of the leased asset
which reduces its operating risk. Second, leasing contracts often contain useful options protect-
ing ﬁrms from increases in future lease rates. This option can be a beneﬁcial feature if future
asset values or lease rates are uncertain (McConnell and Schallheim 1983). But there are also
economical rationales to choose leasing instead of debt ﬁnancing; a lessor may be able to ex-
ploit economies of scale by buying and managing assets in bulk at less expense than the lessee.
These economies of scale can also help to overcome the inherent problem of commercialization
of the asset after repossession in particular if the asset is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and/or a market for such
an asset is fairly small or inexistent. Another reason is the often mentioned tax advantage: If the
tax rate of the lessor exceeds that of the lessee the tax savings from deducting the depreciation
of the asset can be split between the two parties or transferred to the lessee in form of smaller
leasing payments (e.g. Elayan et al. (2006)).
Adedeji and Stapelton (1996) hypothesize that leasing may be used as a secondary, more
expensive form of ﬁnance, after ﬁrms have used up their primary debt capacity. They illustrate
a solution to this apparent contradiction of the lease-debt substitutability theory by the example
of the demand for two close substitutes, such as apples and oranges: Consumers who do not
like fruits will have a low demand for both whereas consumers which appreciate fruits will have
both albeit in a substitutional relation.
Yan (2006) also takes the cost of debt into consideration and interprets rising interest rates
paid on outstanding debt with rising leases as evidence of the substitution-theory and argues
that this interpretation is in line with the trade off theory of capital structure. This interpreta-
tion, however, poses the question of the direction or causality of the relation: Does the use of
(extensive) debt foster leasing in the sense that lessors offer capital to ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms facing difﬁculties of obtaining regular credit from a bank) or do the extra
amount of leases increase the probability of default and thus increase the cost of external capi-
tal? An argument can be made for both perspectives. On the one hand, German insolvency law
(§ 47 InsO) does not count leased assets as bankruptcy assets and thus reduces the loss given
default for the lessor in case of a ﬁrm insolvency. This enables him to implicitly extend more
6credit than a lender whose claim is secured by the same asset (Eisfeldt and Rampini 2009).5
Thus, the ability to repossess an asset allows the lessor to provide ﬁnancing even to borrowers
who are ﬁnancially constrained due to low degrees of creditworthiness or higher rates of debt.
Another explanation for the incentive of ﬁrms to lease could be to limit credit exposure to
their house bank(s) to mitigate potential hold-up problems. These leases, however, are treated
as additional debt by banks and thus reduce the debt capacity because they raise the probability
of default.6 Therefore, additional leases also have an impact on the interest rate charged by
banks on additional loans provided that banks act rationally. However, if leasing is provided by
the same bank, the hold-up problem remains.
A similar notion applies to the leverage of a ﬁrm as well as to its ratio of ﬁxed asset to
total assets. Clearly, the use of operating leases has an impact on its capital intensity because
leased ﬁxed assets are not recorded on the balance sheet. But capital intensive ﬁrms may also
have a stronger incentive to lease to mitigate the underinvestment problem described by Stulz
and Johnson (1985) and for factors such as service contracts for the leasing gods or the option-
argument made by McConnell and Schallheim.
These ambiguous relations have implications on the type of the utilized econometric model
and will be addressed in section 5.
3.1 Hypotheses and instated variables
Inthefollowing, table2presentsthehypothesestestedintheregressionsaswellastheeconomic
rationales on their inﬂuence. Table 3 consists of three different sets of variables: (i) dependent;
(ii) independent (ﬁrm characterisitcs); and (iii) control variables. All variables (except legal
form) have been deﬂated by the consumer price index of 2005.
[Insert table 2 around here]
[Insert table 3 around here]
5Contrary to German legislature, lessors under the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code in the US have a diminished
ability to claim the asset once a ﬁrm is in default. However, it is possible and likely that US leasing contracts differ
from German ones to account for this eventuality.
6See e.g. Molina (2005) for the impact of leverage on ratings.
74 Data and descriptive overview
Our sample draws on data provided by the German Savings Banks Association (DSGV) and
contains 147,376 ﬁnancial statements of (anonymized) small and medium enterprises for the
period 2002 to 2006. For our descriptive analysis we start by dividing the sample into leasing
(62,257 observations) and non-leasing ﬁrms (85,119 observations). In the next step the sample
of ﬁrms which use lease ﬁnancing is sorted for outliers and ﬁrm observations with missing
variabes are eliminated. These adjustments lead to the ﬁnal (unbalanced) sample used in the
regressions and comprises 20,442 ﬁrm observations. Table 4 starts by giving an overview over
thefullsamplewhilesubsequenttablesdescribetheobservationsusedintheregressionanalysis.
We see that the proportion of ﬁrms which use leasing has increased by 27.5% in relative
terms over the observation period. Notably, ﬁrms decreased their overall leverage during this
period from 80% to 72% accompanied by a decrease of their rates paid on external capital
from 5.1% to 4.3%. A separate inspection of lessee and non-lessee ﬁrms yields the interesting
observation that lessee ﬁrms are higher leveraged.7 This ﬁnding was also reported by Ang and
Petersen (1984) and led to the well-known "leasing puzzle" which was, as mentioned earlier,
induced by an inclusion of non-lessee ﬁrms in the sample.
[Insert table 4 around here]
Table 5 now turns to the sample consisting only of lessee ﬁrms and looks at the properties
of ﬁrms using capitalized ﬁnance and non-capitalized leases. With a 90% usage of the latter,
non-capitalized leases seem to be the predominant form of leasing in Germany. The decision
to capitalize leases seems to be driven in part by lower leverage ratios or factors which simul-
taneously inﬂuence both, like ﬁrm size. Large ﬁrms, for instance, frequently lease assets such
as ﬁrm-speciﬁc production lines with low secondary market values which, in turn, have to be
recorded as capitalized leases.
[Insert table 5 around here]
To put the importance of leasing in regard to ﬁrm size into perspective table 6 describes the
ﬁnancing costs of smaller and larger ﬁrms in the sample.8 We see that overall lease expenses
7A ratio of 77% debt to total assets for lessee ﬁrms and 70% for non-lessee ﬁrms. A two-sample Wilcoxon
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test suggests that these differences are not caused by random ﬂuctuation.
8Quartile one (smaller ﬁrms) includes ﬁrms with total assets up to e 0.37m, quartile two up to e 1.04m, quartile
three up to e 3.37m and the fourth quartile (larger ﬁrms) contains all ﬁrms with total assets greater than e 3.37m.
The respective ﬁgures monotonically increase (interest) or decrease (leases) from 1st to 4th quartile. However, for
illustrating purposes only 1st and 4th quartile are reported.
8have a large impact on ﬁrms’ external ﬁnancing costs. This impact is even stronger for smaller
companies for which leasing constitutes the major part (52%) of ﬁnancing expenses. Large
ﬁrms, on the other hand, cover a relatively smaller 32% of their external ﬁnance requirements
by leases while 68% stems from debt ﬁnancing. Moreover, we see that not only the number of
ﬁrms using leasing has risen (table 4) but also ﬁrms’ share of external funding costs attributable
to leasing increased from 37% in 2002 to 43% in 2006. However, although leasing seems to
play a large role for SME the impact on ﬁrms’ overall ﬁnancing costs is likely to be overstated
because lease expenses – opposed to interest expenses – frequently include the depreciation of
the ﬁnanced assets. Since leasing contracts greatly differ in their form and maturity the exact
impact is difﬁcult to assess.
[Insert table 6 around here]
To sum up, around half of the ﬁrms in our sample make use of leasing of which 90% prefer
non-capitalized leases. The use of leasing as ﬁnancing instrument has increased by 16% (in
relative terms) over the observation period while it seems to be much more important for smaller
ﬁrms for which leases represent the major part of their external ﬁnancing costs.
5 Methodology
To model the relation between a ﬁrm’s leasing rate and the explanatory variables from section
three we start with a common ﬁxed effects linear panel model.9 The reason for this approach
is to (i) test the robustness of our assumptions under different models and to (ii) assess the
potential bias arising from endogeneity and heteroskedasticity problems which are accounted
for in later models. Subsequently, we specify the model as follows:
LRit = i + 1LEit + 2ACIit + 3CIit + 4TRit + 5SZit + 6ROAit
+7LQit + 8SMit + 9GEit +
16 X
j=10
jLFi + 
t + it (1)
with the respective abbreviations depicted in parentheses: LR (lease ratio), LE (leverage), ACI
(average cost of interest), CI (capital intensity), TR (tax rate), SZ (ﬁrm size), ROA (proﬁtabil-
ity), LQ (liquidity), SM (sales margin), GE (growth enterprise) and LF (legal form) with j =
10,..., 16.
9Fixed effects were preferred to random effects based on Hausman testing.
9As pointed out in section three there is potential simultaneity in the proposed function which
means that for some variables the function works not only in the direction Y = f(X), but also
X = f(Y ). This two-way causality can lead to a correlation of the explanatory variables with
the error term which leads to a failure of the zero conditional mean assumption E(uijxi) = 0.
This failure of the i.i.d condition will yield inconsistent estimates of any regressions with OLS
methods, however speciﬁed, where reverse causality might be present.
This notion that two or more variables are jointly determined in the behavioral model is
stated as a problem of endogeneity. In order to cope with the problem of endogeneity in si-
multaneous systems instrumental variable (IV) measures were developed. The basic idea of IV
measures is to isolate the two parts of the explanatory variable (x): The part correlated with
 and the part uncorrelated with . By identifying an IV (z) that is correlated with x but not
with , i can be estimated consistently. The requirements for the IV are thus (i) relevance:
cov(zi;xi) 6= 0 and (ii) exogeneity: cov(zi;i) = 0. We follow the frequently applied ap-
proach in econometrics of overcoming the problem of ﬁnding appropriate IVs by instrumenting
the endogenous variables using exogenous variables and lags of the endogenous variables as
instruments.
This paper deﬁnes the setting for the IV estimation as a generalized method of moments
(GMM) optimization problem as introduced by Hansen (1982). The advantages of GMM over
IV are that in the presence of heteroskedasticity the GMM estimator is more efﬁcient than the
simple IV estimator, whereas if heteroskedasticity is not present, the GMM estimator is no
worse asymptotically than the IV estimator (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2003). An analyt-
ical deduction of both the IV and GMM estimation framework is also provided by Baum and
Schaffer (2007). For the two-step GMM estimation we utilize model (2) with the variables
LEit, ACIit and CIit considered endogenous. The variables are so instrumented by the exoge-
nous variables: TRit, SZit, ROAit, LQit, SMit, GEit, LFi, 
t; and the previous realizations
of the endogenous variables : LEit 1, LEit 2, ACIit 1, ACIit 2, CIit 1 and CIit 2. All the
regressions are estimated using Schaffer’s (2005) xtivreg2-procedure in STATA.
To account for heteroskedasticity of unknown form robust standard errors are computed to
derive a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix (VCE). Furthermore, the model
presented in table 9 (results section) also accounts for autocorrelation in the disturbance terms
bycomputingNewey-West(1987)estimatesoftheVCEusingtheBartlett-kernelweighting(Baum
2006, p.199).
106 Results
To obtain a ﬁrst impression about the magnitude and direction of the relation between the vari-
ables the correlation matrix is presented in table 7. The results of the matrix should be in-
terpreted with caution because pair-wise correlation can be misleading if control factors are
omitted that are simultaneously correlated with both variables.
[Insert table 7 around here]
Thematrixshowsinparticular, thatlong-termdebthasnegativeimpactontheleaseswhereas
short term debt positively inﬂuences the lease ratio. Hart and Moore (1995) suggest that total
long-term ﬁnancing should roughly equal total long-term investments because long-term asset
tend to be ﬁnanced with long-term liabilities. Thus, the observed relation could indicate that
ﬁrms which are restrained from long-term ﬁnancing fund their growth with leasing and short-
term debt. The amount of trade credit, on the other hand, is often applied in academic literature
as a proxy for the ﬁnancial constraint of a ﬁrm (Petersen and Rajan 1995). The implicit as-
sumption is that the rates for trade credit are frequently much higher than for funds obtained
from banks (Smith 1992). Thus, the positive sign of trade credit could imply that ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms lease more. This notion is implemented in table 8 (model 1) which shows
the results of the ﬁxed effects panel estimation when total debt is divided into trade credit,
short-term and long-term debt. All regressions are run with both time ﬁxed effects and dummy
variables accounting for the legal form of the respective ﬁrm.
[Insert table 8 around here]
The results for model (1) show that the coefﬁcients for trade credit, short-term credit and
long-term credit are all negative while only long-term credit is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. In
regard to trade credit, Miwa and Ramseyer (2005) point out that evidence for trade credit as
expensive form of external ﬁnancing is weak and also difﬁcult to reconcile due to its ubiquitous
nature. Since the various debt maturities have the same directional inﬂuence on the lease ratio
subsequent models comprise the different debt maturities to a single measure for total debt
obligations.
The results for model (2) show that the coefﬁcient for leverage is insigniﬁcant when the
model is estimated with a robust sandwich estimator. Notably, the average cost of debt are also
not signiﬁcant in either model. The coefﬁcients for capital intensity, ﬁrm size and the tax rate,
11on the other hand, are in line with expectations. However, a model check in form of a modiﬁed
(for unbalanced data) Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity (Greene 2000, p. 598) in the
ﬁxed effect regression models rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedastic errors in the context
of pooled cross-section panel data at the 1% level. Although Baum (2000) notes that in the
context of ﬁxed effects with "large N and small T" panel simulations of the test statistic have
shown that its power is very low, we can not discard the presence of heteroskedasticity and
thus the probability that the standard errors of our coefﬁcients are underestimated. The second
problem, as addressed in the previous section, is that the estimations are likely to suffer from a
bias due to endogeneity problems.
Therefore, we now turn to the ﬁnal model (table 9) which accounts for potential endogeneity
problems as well as for ﬁrms’ ﬁxed effects. Because a Wooldridge test (Wooldridge 2002, p.
264) for autocorrelation in panel data rejects the null of no ﬁrst-order autocorrelation the model
uses standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.10 Due to the
instrumenting of our three endogenous variables, however, about half of the observations are
lost.
[Insert table 9 around here]
First, we take a look at the variables that are likely to reﬂect some kind of credit constraint.
Myers (1976) suggested that growth ﬁrms will employ less debt ﬁnance because of possible
agency problems. Based on this notion, Stulz and Johnson (1985) show that a ﬁrm and its cred-
itors can mitigate the underinvestment problem by allowing subsequent debt to be secured by
the ﬁnanced assets. Hence, leasing contracts with the inherent ability of the lessor to repossess
the asset can offer ﬁnance to ﬁrms that are at the limit of their debt capacity. The regression
results show that the relation between the growth rate of ﬁrms and leasing is positive and sig-
niﬁcant at the 5% level suggesting that high-growth ﬁrms tend to lease assets to overcome the
underinvestment problem. Even though this effect is statistically signiﬁcant, the small value
of its coefﬁcient suggests that its economic impact is rather small. Similarly, the lower sales
margins of lessee ﬁrms (1% level) show that these ﬁrms either have commodity products and/or
a low cost efﬁciency which, in turn, could indicate a lower debt capacity. Although low sales
10The model presented in table 9 was also estimated with the ratio of ﬁnance lease obligations over total assets
as dependent variable (not reported). Yet, all variables turned out insigniﬁcant and the weak identiﬁcation test
suggested a severe bias. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) and supports the idea that
it is the lower cost of repossessing capital under operating leases which causes the empirical relationship between
ﬁnancial characteristics and the fraction of leased capital.
12margins and proﬁtability do not automaticially rule each other out (e.g. telecom companies
frequently exhibit these properties) the relatively small size of the ﬁrms in our sample does not
seem to support such business models. The negative relation between liquidity and leasing (5%
level), on the other hand, could imply credit rationing by banks due to a higher probability of
default because companies can not ensure to pay back their short-term debt by the liquidation
of short-term assets within a given time frame. Further, the ﬁrm size coefﬁcient is also negative
and highly signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) indicating that smaller ﬁrms may lease a greater share
of their assets due to asymmetric information problems. Because our sample is rather homoge-
neous (in terms of ﬁrm size) it would be conceivable that the differences in size are too small
to have an impact on the degree of the informational transparency of the ﬁrms. However, if
we consider the legal form of ﬁrms we see that in particular those legal forms which are pre-
dominatly used by small ﬁrms with no or very limited disclosure requirements (Einzelﬁrma,
BGB-Gesellschaft, KG, OHG) have positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. The legal form coefﬁ-
cient, on the other hand, that is primarily used by larger ﬁrms (AG) with stricter disclosure rules
has a negative sign.11 These ﬁndings provide further suggestive evidence supporting the theory
that smaller ﬁrms tend to be more opaque than larger ﬁrms, even in relatively homogeneous
samples such as the one employed.
Secondly, the negative sign of the leverage and the positive sign of the average interest
cost coefﬁcient (both signiﬁcant) are in line with the substitution theory of leases and debt
and indicate that ﬁrms with higher funding costs lease a larger proportion of their assets. The
coefﬁcient for proﬁtability (ROA) is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level which is likely to
reﬂect the mechanical relation that the ROA rises when its denominator is decreased by the use
of moreleases. Asimilar explanationis suggestedin caseof thecapital intensitywhose negative
and signiﬁcant (1% level) coefﬁcient seems to support the notion that ﬁrms with a higher share
of leases record less assets on their balance sheet. Lastly, ﬁrms seem not to use leases to reduce
their tax burden. In fact, we observe the opposite: ﬁrms with lower tax expenses employ more
lease ﬁnancing. This ﬁnding casts some doubt on the often made argument by lessors that
leasing helps to "save" taxes.
11WerefrainherefromtranslatingtherespectivelegalformsinEnglishbecausetherearenoexactlegalequivalents
in the US or UK, in particular in regard to the disclosure requirements.
13Model validation tests We start the assessment of the robustness of our results by considering
the underidentiﬁcation test.12 The underidentiﬁcation test is a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test of
whether the excluded instruments (in this case the lagged variables) are relevant, i.e. correlated
with the endogenous regressors. The test is basically the test of the rank of a matrix: under
the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentiﬁed, the matrix of reduced-form coefﬁcients
of the excluded instruments (L1) has rank = K1   1 where K1 = number of endogenous
regressors. Under the null, the statistic is distributed as 2 with (L1   K1 + 1) = degrees of
freedom (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007). The rejection of the null for our model (table 9)
indicates that the matrix is full column rank, i.e. that our model is identiﬁed.
Now that we know that our IVs are correlated with the endogenous variables we also need
to check whether they satisfy the second requirement of cov(zi;i) = 0. This is done with a the
Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen 1982). In a GMM framework this
test becomes Hansen’s J statistic which is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error
term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A
rejection of the test statistic would cast doubt on the validity of the instruments. In our case,
however, the statistic is far from the rejection of its null, giving us greater conﬁdence that the
set of instruments is appropriate.
Subsequently, we test for weak identiﬁcation which arises when the excluded instruments
are only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors. If the excluded instruments have
only little explanatory power an increased bias in the estimated IV coefﬁcients will be the con-
sequence and the estimates may thus be no improvement over OLS.
Stock and Yogo (2005) provide testing for weak instruments with the null that instruments
are weak. Weak instruments can lead to an asymptotic maximal IV relative bias (relative to the
bias of OLS) that it is subject to some critical level which the investigator ﬁnds unacceptably
large. In respect to the estimated model the weak instrument bias is less than 15% of OLS which
we interpret as acceptably small.13
If we compare the results of table 8 for ﬁxed effects models and table 9 for GMM models
it shows that in particular the impact of the variables that most likely encounter problems of
endogeneity (leverage and interest costs) is severely underestimated if endogeneity is not ac-
counted for. As Yan (2006) points out, this identiﬁcation problem may be the explanation to the
12Values for all discussed robustness checks are reported in table 9.
13For a further discussion of weak instrument testing for linear models see Stock and Yogo (2005).
14controversy of ﬁndings of previous studies that examined debt-lease relationships.
7 Conclusion
The objective of this paper has been to present and discuss empirical evidence on the role of
leasing for small and medium sized enterprises. Over the examined period the number of ﬁrms
using leasing (operating and ﬁnance) has grown by 27.5%. Altogether around 50% of ﬁrms in
oursampleusedsomeformofleasingattheendof2006ofwhich90%preferrednon-capitalized
leases. But not only prevalence but also the use of leases for lessee ﬁrms has increased by 16%
over the observation period.
We tested in particular the hypothesis that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms lease a higher share
of their assets to mitigate problems of asymmetric information. Therefore, a comprehensive
measure of total lease expenses was utilized as proxy for the degree of the ﬁnancial constraint
of a ﬁrm.
For small ﬁrms leasing appears to play a vital role in providing ﬁnancing, since leasing
costs comprise 52% of their external ﬁnancing expenses. Larger ﬁrms, on the other hand, cover
a relatively smaller 32% of their external ﬁnancing requirements with leasing. Notably, the
average interest costs are 5.1% for small ﬁrms and 4.2% for larger SME in our sample. These
descriptive ﬁgures are further corroborated by the results of a GMM estimation that higher
interest costs, smaller ﬁrm size, strained liquidity and higher growth rates have a positive impact
on leasing.
On balance the descriptive and empirical evidence seems to support the theory that ﬁrms
which are more likely to suffer from problems of asymmetric information have a greater exi-
gency to lease. These results are in line with Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) who ﬁnd strong support
for the hypothesis that ﬁrms that are prone to be burdened with relatively high premiums for
external funds also have a greater propensity to lease as well as with the ﬁndings of Krishnan
and Moyer (1994) that lessee ﬁrms have higher growth rates. Furthermore, the results suggest
that the tax argument, often used by lessors as selling point, does not have an impact on the
decision to lease.
Anotherimportantfacetofleasingthathas, toourknowledge, notbeencoveredbyacademic
research so far are the principal-agency problems in joint ventures between lessors and banks
that can arise if banks – on the basis of commission or on their own account – also offer leasing
15to their customers. This other side of the principal-agent relationship we suggest, provides an
interesting ﬁeld for further research.
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Table 1: Requirements for the lessee to capitalize the ﬁnance lease
Lease without option to
buy or prolong
Lease with option to buy
the asset
Lease with the option to
prolong the contract
Special lease
(a) If the minimum lease
term is less than 40% or
more than 90% of the aver-
age useful life of the asset
(a) or (b) if the minimum
lease term is less than 40%
or more than 90% of the
average useful life of the
asset and if the option
price to buy the asset is
less than its value resulting
from a linear depreciation
according to the respective
ofﬁcial tables (AfA).
If (a) is given and (c) the
subsequentrentislessthan
the usual depreciation rate
of the asset.
If the lease is ﬁrm-speciﬁc,
i.e. it can only be used
by the lessee the asset has
tobecapitalizedregardless
of (a), (b) or (c).
Table 2: Compilation of hypotheses
Hypothesis Independent
variable(s)
Expected sign
H1 The primary aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis put forth by
Eisfeld and Rampini (2009) that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms lease a
greater share of their assets to mitigate problems of asymmetric infor-
mation. Since the degree of the ﬁnancial constraint of a ﬁrm is not
directly observable we aim to proxy for it by using several indicator
variables.
Firm size (-),
growth (+), cost
of debt (+),
sales margin (-),
liquidity (-)
See respective
variable
H2 The trade-off theory of capital structure views leases as substitutes for
secured debt. The theory predicts that leases and debt are substitutes
since a ﬁrm’s marginal cost of new debt or new leases increases with
ﬁxed claim obligations in place (Yan 2006). Hence, an increase in the
leverage of a ﬁrm should lead to a compensating decrease of the use of
leases.
Leverage Negativ
H3 The tax-arbitrage argument typically predicts that leasing participants
gainwhenthelessor’staxrateexceedsthatofthelessee(Elayan, Meyer,
and Li 2006, Eisfeldt and Rampini 2009). In the German case, however,
there is only a single corporate tax rate and thus the arbitrage-argument
can not be applied. Yet an often made "selling argument" by lessors is
that the (fully deductible) leasing rate may be higher than the maximal
depreciation rate and thus help to reduce taxes in a given year (although
not on the whole). Based on the assumption that lessees in fact use
leases to reduce their tax burden in a given year we would expect a
positive relation between the taxrate and the lease ratio.
Tax rate positiv
17Table 3: Deﬁnitions of the main variables employed in the empirical tests
Dependent variable
Lease ratio The lease ratio depicts a ﬁrm’s dependency on leasing and is measured by total lease expenses over to-
tal assets. The dependent variable supports the idea that lease contracts can provide ﬁnancing to credit-
constrained ﬁrms due to their repossessing advantage of the ﬁnanced asset in case of default.
Independent variables (ﬁrm characteristics)
Tax rate This is a measure of the average tax rate of the ﬁrm which is deﬁned by tax expenses before ﬁnancing
costs divided by income before tax and ﬁnancing costs (i.e. lease and interest expenses). To account for
different taxation requirements of private German ﬁrms with no limited liability, an additional 25/% (the
corporate tax rate for the observation period) of income before tax has been added to the tax expenses of
those ﬁrms that are exempt from corporate taxes (Einzelunternehmen, OHG, Genossenschaft, KG, BGB) to
ensure comparability.
Firm proﬁtability Proﬁtability is employed as a measure of economic performance and is deﬁned as the ratio of income before
taxes over total assets (ROA).
Firm size Firm size is depicted by the natural logarithm of total assets and is one of the most widely used proxies
for the level of ﬁnancial constraint (e.g. Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989); Oliner and Rudebusch (1992)).
It accounts for different ﬁnancing patterns of larger ﬁrms due to a better access to capital markets and
cash-pooling agreements within the ﬁrm. Furthermore, large ﬁrms face less severe asymmetric information
problems due to higher reporting requirements and analyst coverage and thus are less likely to be credit
constraint.
Firm growth As proxy for growth ﬁrms the sales growth of actual to prior year is taken.
Liquidity The liquidity ratio is calculated by current assets over short-term liabilities and gives the degree by which
short-term funds are covered by assets that can be liquidated within a short time. A ratio below 100%
indicates illiquidity and thus increases the risk of default.
Sales margin The sales margin is obtained by dividing net proﬁts by gross sales and reﬂects the proﬁtability (and efﬁ-
ciency) of a business.
Cost of debt The average cost of debt of a ﬁrm is deﬁned by interest expenses over total debt. In this regard a note of
caution is in order because the data does not allow to account for different rates paid on long- and short-
term debt. However, an inspection of the relative proportion of longer and shorter liabilities of ﬁrms in
our sample shows that this relation remains rather stable over different size classes and thus a potential
distortion due to interest costs of different debt maturities should be reasonably low.
Leverage The leverage of a ﬁrm is depicted by total debt over total assets.
Control variables
Time ﬁxed effects The time dummy accounts for effects that may inﬂuence all ﬁrms in a given year by the same amount.
This facilitates the elimination of possible sources of spuriousness due to common trend in the observed
variables.
Legal form The dummy variable differentiates seven legal forms of ﬁrms and accounts for differences in reporting and
ﬁscal requirements. Smaller ﬁrms in which the owner’s liability is not limited by his share often have legal
forms such as "Einzelunternehmen" ( Sole trader) or "Offene Handelsgesellschaft (OHG)" ( General
partnership) which have less reporting requirements and can therefore be considered more informationally
opaque.
Capital intensity This variable is comprised by ﬁxed assets over total assets. Since industry codes were not available for this
study, the variables legal form and capital intensity are instated to control for the main industry effects.
18Table 4: Firm characteristics of lessee ﬁrms and non-lessee ﬁrms
Table 4 shows the median properties of all ﬁrms as well as features of lessee and non-lessee ﬁrms respectively. Our classiﬁcation of the latter
is relatively crude; a ﬁrm is counted as a non-lessee ﬁrm if it reports no lease expenses in the income statement and lessee ﬁrms vice versa.
Leverage is calculated as total debt over total assets. The cost of debt are obtained by dividing interest expenses by total debt liabilities,
long-term debt (over 5 years maturity) is depicted as fraction of total loans and liquidity is calculated as current assets over short-term debt.
Year No. of obs. Percent. of
lessee ﬁrms
Leverage Total assets
in e
Cost of
debt
Long-term
debt
Liquidity
2002 26,436 40% 80% 780,922 5.1% 12% 111%
2003 30,361 43% 78% 763,485 5.0% 11% 114%
2004 31,804 45% 77% 749,236 4.7% 10% 115%
2005 31,734 47% 75% 777,000 4.4% 9% 117%
2006 27,041 51% 72% 896,857 4.3% 9% 125%
Average 147,376 45% 76% 793,500 4.7% 10% 116%
Lessee ﬁrms 62,257 100% 77% 857,442 4.6% 9% 116%
Non-lessee ﬁrms 85,119 0% 70% 751,037 4.8% 11% 117%
Table 5: Description of ﬁrms using non-capitalized and capitalized ﬁnance leases
Table 5 shows the percentage of ﬁrms using using non-capitalized (operating and ﬁnance) as well as capitalized ﬁnance leases and their
respective properties. A ﬁrm is counted as non-capitalized lease ﬁrm if it reports lease expenses in the income statement but no ﬁnance lease
liabilities on the balance sheet. A ﬁrm using capitalized ﬁnance leases, on the other hand, is classiﬁed in this group if it reports lease liabilities
on the balance sheet.
Firms using non-capitalized leases Firms using capitalized ﬁnance leases
Year No. of obs. Leverage Percent. of
lessee ﬁrms
Cost of
debt
Leverage Percent. of
lessee ﬁrms
Cost of
debt
2002 2,191 0.76 91% 4.9% 0.73 9% 5.0%
2003 3,097 0.74 91% 4.7% 0.68 9% 4.7%
2004 4,576 0.72 90% 4.5% 0.63 10% 4.2%
2005 5,194 0.72 90% 4.2% 0.64 10% 3.8%
2006 5,384 0.69 89% 4.1% 0.61 11% 3.8%
Average 20,442 0.73 90% 4.5% 0.66 10% 4.3%
Table 6: Lease and interest expense ratios of lessee ﬁrms by years
Table 6 shows the ratio of total lease and interest expenses to total ﬁnancing costs as well as the average interest rates of small and large ﬁrms
respectively.
All ﬁrms 1st quartile (small) 4th quartile (large)
Year No. of obs. Leases Interest Leases Interest Cost of
debt
Leases Interest Cost of
debt
2002 2,191 37% 63% 49% 51% 5.5% 29% 71% 4.5%
2003 3,097 39% 61% 51% 49% 5.3% 31% 69% 4.4%
2004 4,576 41% 59% 53% 47% 5.1% 33% 67% 4.2%
2005 5,194 42% 58% 54% 46% 4.8% 33% 67% 4.1%
2006 5,384 43% 57% 54% 46% 4.8% 34% 66% 3.8%
Average 20,442 40% 60% 52% 48% 5.1% 32% 68% 4.2%
19Table 7: Correlation matrix
20,442 observations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Lease ratio (1) 1
Debt<1 year (2) 0.08* 1
Debt>5 year (3) -0.09* -0.43* 1
Trade credit (4) 0.06* 0.33* -0.35* 1
Cost of debt (5) 0.06* -0.23* 0.18* -0.26* 1
Capital intensity (6) -0.05* -0.42* 0.41* -0.35* 0.15* 1
Tax rate (7) -0.13* -0.15* -0.10* 0.11* -0.14* -0.12* 1
Proﬁtability (8) 0.23* -0.06* -0.06* 0.03* 0.10* -0.08* 0.37* 1
Size (9) -0.25* -0.02* -0.06* 0.01* -0.13* 0.10* -0.14* -0.41* 1
Growth enterprise (10) -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02* 1
Liquidity (11) -0.04* -0.38* -0.02* 0.00 0.08* -0.12* 0.15* 0.06* 0.04* 0.00 1
* indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Table 8: Fixed effects linear panel data models
Model1 (1) (2)
Variables Lease ratio Lease ratio
Leverage -0.00964
(0.0079)
Trade credit -0.00218
(0.0108)
Short term debt<1 year -0.00592
(0.0079)
Long term debt>1 year -0.00977*
(0.0070)
Cost of debt -0.00518 -0.0102
(0.0479) (0.0481)
Capital intensity -0.0236* -0.0252**
(0.0121) (0.0116)
Tax rate -0.0782*** -0.0791***
(0.0093) (0.0093)
Size -0.0274*** -0.0272***
(0.0033) (0.0033)
Proﬁtability 0.0391*** 0.0388***
(0.0133) (0.0134)
Liquidity -0.000161 -0.00024
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Sales margin -0.0000005*** -0.0000005***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Growth enterprise 1.34E-06* 1.34E-06*
(1.1E-06) (1.3E-06)
Legal form effects Yes Yes
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Constant 0.424*** 0.424***
(0.0479) (0.0477)
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 20,442 20,442
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
1 Models estimated with robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator
20Table 9: 2-step GMM model
Model1
Variables Lease ratio (?)Legal forms
Leverage -0.0951*** Einzelﬁrma 0.0339***
(0.0328) (0.0104)
Cost of debt 0.291* BGB-Gesellschaft 0.0481***
(0.1630) (0.0101)
Capital intensity -0.0807** OHG 0.0388***
(0.0408) (0.0104)
Tax rate -0.0958*** KG 0.0267***
(0.0139) (0.0098)
Proﬁtability 0.0256** GmbH 0.00474
(0.0124) (0.0049)
Firm size -0.0160*** GmbH & Co. KG 0.00413
(0.0057) (0.0043)
Liquidity -0.00154** AG -0.00689
(0.0007) (0.0104)
Sales margin -0.000002***
(-6.66E-07)
Growth enterprise 0.0000009**
(-4.51E-07)
Legal form effects(?) Yes
Time ﬁxed effects Yes
Underidentiﬁcation test 0.000
Weak identiﬁcation test2 5.41*
Overidentiﬁcation test 0.95
Number of observations 10,497
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
1 Model robust for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
2 Critical values for the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak-instrument test (5-percent signiﬁcance) based on TSLS size
with exact identiﬁcation are 12.20, 7.77, 5.35 and 4.40 for the 5-percent, 10-percent, 20-percent, 30-percent sizes,
respectively. *** means that the weak instruments hypothesis is rejected with the most stringent criterion, ** means the
null is rejected with the second criterion, and * that it is rejected with the third criterion.
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